Abstract: Carbon sequestration is a temporal process in which carbon is continuously being stored/released over a period of time. Di erent methods of carbon accounting can be used to account for this temporal nature, including annual average carbon, annualized carbon, and ton-year carbon. In this paper, starting by exposing the underlying connections among these methods, we examine how the comparisons of sequestration projects are a ected by these methods and the major factors a ecting them. We explore the empirical implications for carbon sequestration policies by applying these accounting methods to the Upper Mississippi River Basin, a large and important agriculture area in the United States. We nd that the di erences are signi cant in terms of the location of land that might be chosen and the distribution of carbon sequestration over the area, although the total amount of carbon sequestered does not di er considerably across programs that use di erent accounting methods or di erent values of the major factors.
Introduction
Carbon sequestration through land use changes and forestry has been the focus of considerable attention in the climate change literature because of its potential as a cost-e ective mitigation strategy. With the Kyoto Protocol becoming a binding treaty, countries may have further incentives to incorporate it into their greenhouse gas management plans. Carbon sequestration is a temporal process that removes carbon from the atmosphere either evenly or unevenly over time: the amount of carbon removal is larger in some periods than in others. Negative sequestration, that is, carbon release into the atmosphere is also possible over some time intervals even though a project has overall positive sequestration. In order to properly assess di erent sequestration projects, it is critical that this temporal attribute be properly accounted for. In this paper, we examine some of the important issues related to 1 carbon accounting and its policy implications when sequestration becomes part of the climate change mitigation portfolio.
In reporting the amount of carbon that has been sequestered in a project, several accounting methods and their variations have been used or proposed in the literature, including the annual average carbon, the annualized carbon, and ton-year carbon. Simply speaking, the annual average carbon, the most widely used accounting method, is the sum of total carbon sequestered over a xed period of time divided by the length of the period. To re ect our preference for bene ts that have occurred earlier, the annualized carbon accounting method discounts carbon sequestered later.
Although new relative to annual average carbon, annualized carbon (or its variation, the present discounted value of carbon) has been employed by many studies, including Adams et al. (1999) , Plantinga et al. (1999) , and Stavins (1999) . A third accounting method, the ton-year carbon, takes into account the duration of carbon kept outside of the atmosphere. Several studies (e.g., Watson et al., 2000; Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000) have analyzed this method with an emphasis on how it facilitates the comparison among projects that sequester (or release) carbon for di erent lengths of time.
Di erent projects may show up as the favorable choices when di erent accounting methods are used. Even under the same accounting method, the ranking of projects may di er, as the value of some factors varies. The rst factor is the project duration.
There might be some natural choices for the value of this factor, for example, the saturation point, which is the length of time needed for a carbon pool to reach equilibrium. Given that there may be di erent carbon pools in a single project (let alone in multiple projects), the use of saturation point may result in (a) di erent durations in di erent projects and (b) a somewhat subjective decision on which, if 2 any, carbon pool's saturation point to use. In fact, di erent durations of projects have been employed in the literature to suit the underlying nature of the analyses. For example, Stavins (1999) used a period of 90 years to allow at least one rotation of each project species; Parks and Hardie (1995) limited their study to the life of a temperate forest; and Adams et al. (1999) chose a 50-year period to investigate the costs of sequestration through both a orestation and improvement in forest management.
The e ect of the choice of project durations is largely determined by the path of a sequestration project (i.e., distribution of carbon sequestration over time), which is the second factor we are going to explore. Obviously, an accounting method that gives more weight to early sequestration will favor a project that sequesters carbon in relatively early periods. Although seldom discussed in the literature on the cost of sequestration, the e ects of di erent mitigation paths have been extensively debated in the more general climatic change literature (see Wigley et al., 1996 and Ramakrishna, 1997) . Some have argued that delaying abatement may be costly because there is socioeconomic inertia in the energy system and the process of climate change is di cult to reverse. If earlier carbon sequestration is valued more, then we may prefer one sequestration project over another even if both projects can sequester the same amount of carbon (undiscounted sum) at the same amount of cost over the same period of time. To take into account the timing of carbon uptake, discounting can be used.
The discount rate is the third factor that we are going to discuss. Instead of sensitivity-type analysis, we examine how the discount rate interacts with sequestration paths and project durations to a ect the results of sequestration policies. The advantage of discounting is that it can re ect preferences for early carbon reduction and allow us to focus on some summary measures (e.g., annualized carbon) without 3 being too concerned about the paths of sequestration. However, discounting also brings its own complications because, as we illustrate, a di erent discount rate may favor a di erent sequestration activity and, even at the same discount rate, di erent projects may become the favorable choice as project durations vary.
Some studies have started investigating the issue of accounting for time in climate mitigation through carbon sequestration. The di erences of alternative accounting methods and the factors a ecting them are discussed in the special report on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Watson et al., 2000 , Chapters 2 and 5). Fearnside et al. (2000) indicated that temporal issues will be key factors in determining whether e orts to mitigate global warming will include carbon sinks and which sequestration activities should be given priority. They identi ed ton-year carbon accounting as a mechanism to compare sequestration of di erent durations. They also showed that discounting can strongly in uence economic decisions. Tipper and De Jong (1998) 
The alternative accounting methods
In order to understand the underlying connections between the accounting methods, we begin with the following framework. Consider a program with a funding of M; which selectively enrolls elds from a total of N agricultural or forest elds to sequester carbon from time 0 to time T: We call T the project duration. Each piece of land is enrolled for some carbon sequestration practices during this period of time.
The size of eld n is denoted as A n ; where n is the index of a eld. Carbon sequestered at time t by a unit of land on eld n is denoted as x n (t) 0: Denote the cost of enrolling a unit of land from eld n as p n (t); which is the pro t forgone and/or establishment expenditures due to the adoption of carbon sequestration activities. Given that our focus is on carbon accounting, for simplicity we assume that the bene t of carbon sequestration for mitigating climate change is constant over time, denoted as b for any t for each unit of carbon sequestered.
Suppose the policymaker's problem is to choose a n for each eld to maximize the present discounted value (PDV) of the bene t from sequestration over the project duration, i.e.,
0 a n A n ;
where r is the discount rate for the policymaker. In the objective function, the inner integration represents the overall bene t from the carbon sequestrated at time t in eld n. The bene t starts accruing from the time of sequestration (t) and lasts is equal to the available funding. 1 It is important to note here that all enrollment occurs at time 0 and a n does not change with time. Because of the reversibility of carbon sequestration, it is important for a policy to enroll a farmer for a relatively long period of time. Also for the same reason of non-permanence, it is important to take into account the duration of bene ts from sequestration.
Using as the multiplier for the budget constraint, the solutions to (1) can be written as follows:
where
Intuitively, is the shadow cost of funding. The left-hand side of the conditions in (2) represents the total PDV of bene t from eld n; while the right-hand side represents the PDV of costs from eld n for carbon sequestration over the project duration. Whether to enroll eld n depends on whether the PDV of bene t is greater than the PDV of cost. If bene t is less than cost, then the eld will not be enrolled. On the contrary, a whole eld will be enrolled if its bene t is greater than the corresponding cost. When bene t and cost are equal for a eld, the area enrolled from the eld (a ) is determined by the price of enrolling the parcel and the funding left after payment for all other parcels with whole-eld enrollment.
The term X n can be considered as a measure of total carbon accumulated on one unit of eld n. In empirical analysis, several important simpli cations of X n are often used, including the sum of carbon, the PDV of carbon, and the ton-year carbon. By dividing a constant (some variation of the length of time), these measures are equivalent to annual average carbon, annualized carbon, and the average ton-year carbon, respectively. We will next de ne these terms, show their connections with X n ; and highlight the assumptions under each of these measures.
De nition 1 The sum of carbon sequestration in a unit of land on eld n ( X n ) is the simple summation of carbon sequestered over [0; T ]; and annual average carbon ( x n ) is the sum of carbon sequestered divided by the corresponding period of time;
that is,
Comparing X n and X n ; we know that the latter is derived by setting r = 0 and assuming that carbon sequestered at time t only has e ect at time t (as opposed to over the period from t to T ): Thus, the sum of carbon does not take into account the fact that, relative to carbon sequestered later, carbon sequestered earlier provides earlier bene t that is usually valued more and provides bene t for a longer duration.
De nition 2 The present discounted value of carbon sequestration in a unit of land on eld n (X n ) is the sum of carbon sequestered over [0; T ] weighted by a discounting term, e rt ; and the annualized carbon (x n ) is a constant equal for all time points such that the PDV of this constant is equal toX n ; that is,
Setting r = 0 inX n , we haveX n = X n : Also, if we assume that carbon sequestered at time t only has e ect at time t; then X n =X n . It may seem unusual De nition 3 The ton-year carbon sequestration in a unit of land on eld n (X n ) is the sum of carbon sequestered over [0; T ] weighted by the length of the period lasting from the time carbon is sequestered until the end of the project duration, 2 and average ton-year carbon (x n ) is a constant equal for all time points such that the ton-year carbon of this constant is equal toX n ; that is,
It is easy to see that the only di erence betweenX n and X n is the discounting factor: speci cally, in the former, r is set to 0: One di erence betweenX n andX n (or X n ) is that the former takes into account the duration of bene t while the latter does not. It is interesting to note that some researchers have proposed a conversion factor between 1 ton-year carbon of sequestration and 1 ton of carbon emission reduction, which is estimated to be about 0.0182 (Moura-Costa and Wilson, 2000; and Tipper and De Jong, 1998) .
From their de nitions, it is clear that the accounting methods can be very different mainly due to some factors: r; T; and x n (t). The sequestration path, x n (t), is given for a xed eld with speci ed land use practices except for variations caused by natural uncertainties. As we discussed in the introduction, the choice of T is not as obvious as it rst appears. When projects have di erent sequestration paths, the choice of r and T may a ect the ranking of projects no matter which carbon accounting method is used. As a result, di erent projects may be included in carbon sequestration policies, which in turn may a ect the overall outcome of policies.
3 The e ects of discounting under di erent carbon paths
If carbon sequestration is linear (i.e., constant over time), say, x n (t) = x; then it is easy to show that all three accounting methods will be equivalent in the sense that the annual average carbon, the annualized carbon, and the average ton-year carbon will have exactly the same value. In such cases, the choice of projects is not a ected by the choice of accounting methods. However, carbon sequestration is usually nonlinear. For example, carbon sequestration by a orestation is largely determined by the accumulation of biomass, which is generally known to be slow at the beginning, faster in the midterm, and then slow again near maturity. The duration of each stage could range from a few years to more than a hundred years, depending on the timber species. Two examples are illustrated in Figure 1 , which is based on Richards et al. (1993) . A similar process also exists for carbon sequestration by switching from conventional tillage to conservation tillage (Lal et al., 1998) .
When linearity is not satis ed, two elds may have quite di erent annualized carbon even if they have the same undiscounted annual averages of carbon and the same r and T are used. In other words,x n x m may be large in absolute value even if x n x m is zero. The disparity betweenx n x m and x n x m is a ected by the curvature of x n (t) and x m (t), sincex n andx m discount later sequestration while x n and x m do not. If we view carbon sequestration x n (t) as the weight attached to the corresponding time t; then x n (t); upon appropriate normalization, can be viewed as the probability density function of t. This view of x n (t) enables utilization of wellknown results in the literature on nance and risk. Before invoking any result, we 9 present the de nitions of two concepts.
De nition 4 Let F i (y) and F j (y) be two cumulative distribution functions (cdf 's) of a random variable y 2 y ; y : (i) F i (y) rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)
for any non-decreasing function (y): (ii) F i (y) second-order stochastically dominates (SOSD) F j (y) if (7) holds for any non-decreasing concave function (y): SOSD F j (y); then the former will be preferred over the latter by risk-averse investors because net returns from the former tend to be less variable and/or higher in all states of nature.
In our context, we can construct a cdf as follows. De ne
; i = 1; 2; :::; N:
Although F i (t) satis es all the conditions required for a cdf, di erent probability densities are only arti cially attached to di erent values of t since t is not a random variable. Based on F i (t), we next provide a proposition on the comparison of carbon paths based on annual average carbon and annualized carbon.
thenx n x m for any r > 0; if F m (t) second-order stochastically dominates F n (t), thenx n x m for r > 0: 3 A proof is given in the appendix. Intuitively, the probability density arti cially given to each value of t is determined by the rate of carbon sequestration. The rst-order stochastic dominance by F m (t) over F n (t) means that proportionally less carbon is accumulated earlier under path x m (t) than under path x n (t): Given that earlier sequestration is valued more (for r > 0) in calculating the PDV of a stream of carbon sequestration, the PDV is greater from x n (t) than from x m (t); that is,
For the paths given in Figure 1 , the two pines have about the same annual average carbon, 2.15 tons/year/acre, for the period from year 0 to year 77. Then based on the curvature of the two paths, it is easy to see that F m (t) rst-order stochastically dominates F n (t) for the same period. Sox n x m for any r > 0 by Proposition 1. In fact, for the same period and at a 2 percent discount rate, the annualized carbon sequestration for loblolly and ponderosa pines arex n = 2:62 and x m = 1:84 tons/year/acre, respectively. The di erence betweenx n x m and x n x m is about 0:78 tons/year/acre, which accounts for 36 percent of the annual average carbon sequestration.
When there is no FOSD relationship between F m (t) and F n (t); the rst half of Proposition 1 does not apply. However, if we know that F m (t) SOSD F n (t); then we can invoke the second half of the proposition. Graphically, the second-order stochastic dominance of F m (t) over F n (t) implies that carbon uptake spreads out more evenly over time and/or occurs earlier along path x n (t) than along path x m (t) (see Figure 2) . Because of discounting, the value of carbon sequestration decreases at an exponential rate, e rt , and so the annualized carbon is higher for a carbon path with relatively more early carbon sequestration. Thus, we havex n x m :
It is important to note that Proposition 1 only applies to some carbon paths since FOSD and SOSD do not completely characterize the relationship between two cdf's. It may happen that neither cdf dominates the other in terms of FOSD or SOSD. In these situations, the comparisons of accounting methods and carbon paths will be more complicated, as illustrated by the following section.
4 The e ects of T, r, and carbon sequestration path
In this section, we will explore by illustration how T , r, and sequestration paths a ect the accounting methods, focusing on how the comparisons of the accounting methods might be a ected by the factors and how the e ects of one factor might be in uenced by another factor. Tables (1a) and (1b) show annualized carbon sequestration (x n ) in an acre of a orestation for two species of pines with di erent r and T. The rst row of the tables (with r = 0) indicates the e ect of di erent T on the annual average carbon. Instead ofX n ; we use its normalized versionx n to make meaningful comparisons because it is hard to make sense of the comparison between carbon sequestered, say, over 20 years and over 50 years, unless we take into account the length of time. The two pines are used as an illustration because of the sharp contrast in their sequestration paths as indicated by Figure 1 .
From Tables (1a) and (1b), we can see that for loblolly pine, as T increases, the annualized carbon decreases for all four discount rates shown, 4 while for ponderosa pine, it rst increases and then decreases. Similarly, as r increases, for ponderosa pine the annualized carbon decreases for all four project durations, while for loblolly pine the relationship varies with T: The lack of a speci c pattern in the change of annualized carbon in response to the change of T (or r) can be explained by the de nition ofx n in (5). For any given r; as T increasesx n will also increase if x n (T ) x n (a term in dx n =dT ) is positive. Intuitively, this implies that if the carbon sequestration rate is higher at T or after T than the annualized sequestration rate over [0; T ]; then as T increases,x n becomes larger. This is the case when T increases from 30 years to 60 or 90 years for ponderosa pine. On the other hand, if the sequestration rate decreases over time, then the di erence of the two terms will be negative andx n will decrease as T increases. This is the case for loblolly pine when T is greater than 30 years or for ponderosa pine when T increases from 90 to 160 years.
Similarly, we can explain the phenomena that, as r increases,x n may increase for one sequestration path but not the other and the trend even varies for the same given path and project duration as in the case of loblolly pine. As r increases, both the numerator, R T 0 e rt x n (t)dt; and the denominator, R T 0 e rt dt; in (5) will decrease. If the former decreases more slowly (quickly) than the latter, thenx n will increase (decrease). That is, if
(negative), thenx n will increase (decrease). The rst ratio is essentially the average of t weighted by e rt and the second ratio is essentially the average of t weighted by e rt x n (t). If the rate of sequestration tends to be higher closer to time T , then the second ratio gives relatively more weight to larger t; which implies the di erence of the two ratios will be negative andx n will decrease with r:
Intuitively, as r increases, the value of later sequestration will be valued even less, 13 which implies lower annualized carbon if sequestration tends to occur later. This is the case for all listed project durations for ponderosa pine, which has an increasing rate of sequestration for a long period of time (nearly 80 years). For loblolly pine, although sequestration starts to decline around year 20, the rate of sequestration is still relatively high for the period between year 20 and year 30. Thus, over the period from year 0 to year 30, more sequestration occurs relatively later, and sox n decreases as r increases. However, for other T values in Table ( 1a), more sequestration occurs relatively earlier and so the value ofx n increases for low discount rates. At the highest discount rate in the table (r = :15); the trend is reversed. The reason is that, at a very large r; the value of e rt decreases rapidly and so only sequestration that occurs really early matters. This means that the increasing trend in the early years of loblolly pine dominates the decreasing trend later. As a result,x n actually decreases. Tables (1a) and (1b), it is obvious that loblolly pine has higher annualized carbon than the ponderosa pine for all T and r except for a very low discount rate and long project duration, that is, (r = 0; T = 90); and (r = 0; T = 160): While not shown, it is not necessarily true that, for a given T value, high discount rates always favor one project while low discount rates favor another.
By comparing the values in
More speci cally, in order to compare the annualized carbon sequestration along two di erent paths x n (t) and x m (t) for the same duration; we can assess the sign of
From the de nition ofx n in (5) Even when the dividing discount rate such that D(r) = 0 is unique, it can change as project duration varies. In the example of the loblolly pine and ponderosa pine, at T = 160; the dividing discount rate is about 0:0153; that is, the PDV of carbon sequestration by loblolly pine is larger if r > 0:0153: At T = 90; the dividing discount rate is about 0:0074; which is smaller than that at T = 160: This is because carbon sequestration by loblolly pine almost tapers o to zero for T > 90; while sequestration by ponderosa pine is still signi cant (see Figure 1) . Thus, for a project duration longer than 90 years, a higher discount rate is needed in order for the PDV of carbon sequestration by loblolly pine to remain larger. Tables 2a and 2b show the average ton-year carbon (x n ) with di erent T for the same two pines. As T increases,x n shows about the same trend asx n with r = 0 (which is also x n , shown in the rst row in Tables (1a) and (1b)). The only di erence is in ponderosa pine going from T = 90 to T = 160:x n is increasing while x n is decreasing. This can be explained by the following di erence in the accounting methods. As T increases, howx n changes depends on the balance of two e ects: the longer duration of early sequestered carbon and the carbon sequestered after T: The rst e ect is not re ected in x n : If too little carbon is sequestered after T , there will be a decreasing pressure onx n : If the increasing e ect from the longer duration of early sequestration cannot outweigh this decreasing e ect; thenx n decreases, as in the case of loblolly pine for all project durations and ponderosa pine when T increases from 90 to 160: However, if there is enough sequestration after T; combined with the increasing e ect of the increased duration of early sequestration, then this means that We consider a green payment type policy; that is, we assume that policymakers pay farmers to adopt conservation practices on their elds to sequester carbon. The conservation practice we consider here is no-till, which has been shown to have carbon sequestration potential (Lal, et al. 1998) . We assume that the goal of the policymakers is to maximize the bene t from carbon sequestration as speci ed in equation (1a) with simpli cations as implied by De nitions 1-3 to account for di erent accounting methods. With a constraint of a given total acreage of land enrolled (speci cally, 20 percent of the UMRB cropped area excluding pasture), it is optimal for policymakers to pay for elds with the highest carbon sequestration potential to adopt no-till.
The alternative policy scenarios we consider di er only by the accounting mecha-nism used to measure sequestration potential. For example, if sum of carbon is used, then elds with the highest sum of carbon over the project duration will be selected rst, regardless of these elds' sequestration potential in terms of ton-year carbon, or the PDV of carbon. Similarly, if ton-year carbon is used, then elds will be ranked by their sequestration potential in terms of ton-year carbon over the project duration and the elds ranked on top will be enrolled into the program, regardless of these elds' sum of carbon or PDV of carbon over the same period.
In the following, we present the results of some pair-wise comparisons of the alternative accounting mechanisms. 6 While these comparisons use a project duration of 20 years, we also illustrate the e ects of project duration by comparing policies which rank elds based on 50-year and 20-year sum of carbon, respectively. For most elds, rapid carbon sequestration occurs within the rst 20 years after switching to no till and a new soil carbon equilibrium will be reached by the 50th year. However, there is a large degree of heterogeneity due to the variations in crop rotation, soil, and other natural conditions. The di erences between the policy scenarios can be illustrated in two ways: the location of elds enrolled and the amount of carbon sequestered. To represent the di erence in the location of land enrolled, we rst compute, for each 8-digit USGS watershed in the UMRB, the area of all elds that are only enrolled under one policy (y 1 ) and the area of all elds that are enrolled under both policies (y 2 ), and then calculate the ratio, 100 y 1 =y 2 . To illustrate the di erence between the amount of carbon sequestered under the policy using one accounting method (y 3 ) and the carbon sequestered under the policy using another accounting method (y 4 ), we use the percentage di erence, that is, 100 (y 4 y 3 )=y 3 . Figure 3A) . Interestingly, in terms of the total sum of carbon sequestered over the whole UMRB, the di erence between the policies is almost negligible (and so not presented here). It is up to policymakers to decide in the actual design of policies (a) the importance of the aggregate sequestration potential, and (b) the importance of heterogeneity in terms of geographical location.
Conclusions
Because of the dynamics of carbon sequestration, the accounting for time in the estimate of carbon storage is critical in assessing sequestration projects and in comparing carbon sinks and other climate change mitigation options. The time dimension of carbon sequestration is accounted for in di erent ways in the di erent accounting methods discussed in this paper. In analyzing sequestration options, the choice of accounting mechanisms tends to be study speci c. The annual average carbon method and a default project duration of 20 years are currently used in IPCC's good practice guidance on inventorying and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and removals in \cropland remaining cropland" and \land converted to cropland" (Penman et al., 2003) . Given that di erent projects might be favored under di erent accounting mechanisms, regions/countries may advocate an accounting system that is most suitable for their sequestration projects. For example, regions with relatively early sequestration may advocate annualized carbon because of its preferential treatment for early sequestration.
The quantity of carbon sequestered is not the only consequence of the use of alternative accounting systems. In fact, in our empirical analysis, no signi cant di erence is found in terms of total amount of carbon sequestered among policies using di erent accounting mechanisms. Instead, we nd that quite di erent geographical areas will bene t under the policies. Our results may be speci c to our study region and the sequestration activities considered. However, this points out a possibility that governments can choose an accounting mechanism to meet other policy goals such as income support for a certain group of people. Of course, how much freedom a national government has in choosing accounting methods depends on the extent of international coordination.
Appendix: Proof for Proposition 1
Note that (t) = e rt is an increasing function for any r > 0. Thus, if F m (t) FOSD F n (t); then by (7) we have
( e rt )dF n (t); 8 r > 0: (A-1)
Plugging in (8) and rearranging, we obtain
e rt x n (t) R T 0 x n (s)ds dt; 8 r > 0:
Given x n = x m ; we know R T 0 x m (s)ds = R T 0 x n (s)ds. Thus we can drop them from both sides of the above inequality. Then, dividing both sides by R T 0 e rt dt, we havê
x m x n ; 8 r > 0:
Similarly, since (t) = e rt is non-decreasing and concave for any r > 0; (A-1) still holds if F m (t) SOSD F n (t): The second half of the proof follows in a way similar to the proof for the rst half of Proposition 1. In all maps,`No Data' indicates that no area is chosen in the sub-watershed.
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